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BOOK REVIEWS

Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy. By THEODOR GOMPERZ. Authorized Translation by G. G. BERRY. Vols. II and III. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1905. Pp. xvi + 397 and xiii + 386. Each \$4, net.

Professor Gomperz' *Greek Thinkers* in this excellent translation will probably supersede Zeller for all but professional students. In a review intended for the more general public (cf. *Dial* August 16, 1901; July 16, 1905) I have already expressed my appreciation of its three chief qualities: (1) its readability; (2) its skilful blending of the history with the discussion of ideas; (3) its consistent adoption of a modern, rational, and scientific point of view. Taking this estimate for granted, I may, without risk of being misunderstood, proceed at once to record my dissent on certain matters of detail that may interest students of the subject, but do not appreciably affect the value of the work as a whole.

In his account of the Socratic method (II, p. 55) Professor Gomperz, influenced perhaps by Grote, exaggerates the distinction between the positive and the negative use of induction. The Platonic Socrates rarely, if ever, elaborates a final positive definition by the inductive method. For Plato, as I have elsewhere shown, has no faith in absolute definitions. But rapid positive induction is frequently employed to win acceptance of a generalization needed in the course of the argument. And proposed definitions are often refuted by such generalizations, or by the direct inductive application of a "negative instance." In any case, it is not true that Aristotle uses *παραβολή* as the technical name of the negative procedure. A negative instance, *ἐνστασίς*, may be associated with a *παραβολή*, but is not of its essence (152 a. 25). The "parable" is merely a species of example or illustration akin to induction, and negativity belongs to it only in so far as τὰ Σωκρατικὰ are apt to be critical or sceptical of dogmatism.

Philologists seek a knot in a bulrush when they raise difficulties about the rôle of a preacher of virtue attributed to Socrates in the *Apology*. Professor Gomperz says (II, p. 107) that such an attitude is irreconcilable with the doctrine that virtue is knowledge. But this proves too much, for Plato himself, with his constant concern for edification, held the doctrine to the end. We can never infer a moralist's practice from the consequences which we impute to his metaphysical prin-

ciples. The Xenophontic Socrates is a tedious moralizer of the commonplace. The Platonic Socrates, whatever his metaphysical theories may be, in fact always appeals to the heart and will, as well as to the intellect. The burden of his protreptic is ὅπως χρὴ σοφίας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμεληθῆναι (*Euthydem.* 278 d). There is no contradiction between the *Apology* and other dialogues. The *Crito* is written throughout in a hortatory and edifying style. In *Phaedo* 115 b ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἐπιμελούμενοι, etc., is as hortatory in its suggestions as ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ἀρετῆς in *Apol.* 31 b; and in *Laches* 188 a Socrates' rôle of moral gadfly is distinctly indicated in Nicias' words: καὶ οὐδὲν οἷμαι κακὸν εἴναι τὸ ὑπομηνήσκεσθαι δ τι μὴ καλῶς ή πεποιήκαμεν ή ποιοῦμεν. It is, of course, possible to force a purely intellectual meaning upon all such passages. But to do so is to beg the question. The whole controversy is idle. Nor is there any evidence to support Joel's hypothesis that Socrates began as a moralist, and, mistaking the means for the end, finally lost himself in dialectics. At the most it can be said that the historic Socrates was perhaps less edifying and emotional than the Platonic.

In his treatment of the Sophists and minor Socratics Professor Gomperz errs, if at all, from an excessive eagerness to rehabilitate them against Plato's criticism. This tendency has two sources: (1) Grote's watchful jealousy to defend modern utilitarian and relativist philosophies against Platonic absolutism; (2) the ingenuity of philologists ever seeking something new. From the first Professor Gomperz should have been warned by Mills's defense of the *Theaetetus* against Grote's championship of *Protagoras*. The only remedy for the second is to repeat that we have no evidence. It is abstractly possible that Antisthenes, Euclid, and the unknown thinkers satirized in the *Philebus* and *Theaetetus* meant all that the most advanced modern nominalists, associationists, and positivists could read into the crude formulas attributed to them. But it is not probable, and there is not an iota of evidence to prove it. Professor Gomperz is inclined to find a developed nominalistic logic in every attack on the Platonic ideas. And he even reads it into a corrupt fragment of Antiphon (*Diels Vorsokratiker*, p. 553. 1), which, so far as its meaning can be made out, plainly deals with another matter.

Professor Gomperz' analyses of the Platonic dialogues are always suggestive and sometimes illuminating. He too often, however, condescends to the "immature" thinker of an earlier time, and reads the greatest dialectician who ever lived lessons in elementary logic, and in his endeavor to detect fallacies, inconsistencies, and chronological developments in the dialogues he verifies again my thesis that such attempts, however plausible *a priori*, almost always ὥσπερ ἐπίτηδες, as if by some fatality, lead to misinterpretation.

Thus in II, p. 332, and III, p. 50, he argues that the *Gorgias* must be earlier than both *Rep.* I and the *Crito*, because Plato is "still" far

removed from the principle of love toward enemies. The only basis for this statement is the paradox, of which I should have thought it impossible to miss the humor, in *Gorg.* 480e that the sole use of the Sophistic rhetoric would be to save your enemy from punishment, that he might suffer the heavier penalty of living in sin. Even that is guarded by the qualification *εἰ ἄρα δὲ τινὰ κακῶς ποιεῖν*. But a little thing like *ἄρα* can not be allowed to mar a point.

Similarly, following Grote, he illustrates Plato's aristocratic prejudices by the passage in the *Gorgias* 512b, where a mechanic "who had (?) saved his country from destruction by inventing an engine of war, is, nevertheless, spoken of in a tone of contempt, just because he labored with his hands." But Plato does not himself especially disparage the engineer. He places him above the successful general, and affirms that Callicles despises him, but is not logically justified in so doing by his own ethics of "survival" and "salvation."

In III, p. 171, after explaining the theory that the *μὴ ὄν = ἔτερον*, he continues: "The non-existent in the province of beauty is simply the ugly The second step of this reduction is logically more assailable than the first." It certainly is. But the second step is taken by Gomperz, not by Plato, who explicitly says (*Sophist.* 257b): *ὅπόταν τὸ μὴ ὄν λέγωμεν, ως ἔστιν, οὐκ ἐναντίον τι λέγομεν τοῦ ὄντος, ἀλλ' ἔτερον μόνον*, and in *Symp.* 201e: *ἢ οἶει, ὃ τι ἀν μὴ καλὸν γῆ, ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὸν εἶναι αἰσχρόν;*

Experiences of this sort do not predispose us in favor of the hypothesis that in *Protag.* 350c Plato intended to attribute to Protagoras the "discovery" that a universal affirmative can not be converted *simpliciter*. And our distrust is confirmed when we find the principle amply illustrated "already" in the *Euthyphro* 12b.

Again in III, p. 159, the "notable fallacy" attributed to Plato in his *reductio ad absurdum* of extreme Heraclitism belongs to his interpreter. "There is," as Gomperz says, and Plato himself says better (*Rep.* 436de), "no contradiction in affirming that in one sense a thing is at rest, while in another it has motion." But this evasion is not competent to an opponent who has accepted change of place and change of quality as two kinds of motion, and still avers that the word and idea "rest" are to be eliminated altogether from thought and speech. And that is the situation in the part of the *Theaetetus* under discussion.

The statement (III, p. 316) that Plato, "while he was still a pure Socrateist, could not be fully conscious of the double sense of *ἄφροσύνη*," begs the question. It is not really conceivable that the author of the *Protagoras*, of *Euthydemus* 277, 278, and of *Theaetetus* 167, 168 was not always aware that a word may have two meanings, and so two opposites.

Of a similar character are many of the alleged inconsistencies and developments. It is hypercritical to argue (II, p. 347) that the exemplary punishment of the incurable in the eschatological myths seriously

contradicts the thesis that punishment is salutary, or that this in turn is incompatible with the recognition by the legislator of both the corrective and the deterrent effect of his penalties.

The statement (II, p. 354) that in the *Laws* Plato's faith in the coincidence of virtue and happiness proclaimed as an axiom in the *Gorgias* "is no longer what it was" sounds strangely in view of his reiterated affirmation that he is more certain of it than of the island of Crete—*ως οὐδὲ Κρήτην νῆσος σαφῶς* (662 b).

In arguing that the *Euthyphro* eliminates piety as a special virtue, and therefore "must" follow the *Gorgias* and precede the *Phaedo* (II, p. 363; III, p. 37), Professor Gomperz forgets that he himself places the *Meno* after the *Euthyphro*, and that the *Meno* recognizes piety, 78 d.

It is not true (III, p. 28) that the *Phaedrus* introduces the ideas "shyly." The oratorical precautions of 247 c evidently refer to the dithyrambic description of the *ἱπερουράνιος τόπος*, which, it is true, involves the ideas.

The assertion (III, p. 30) that the technical term *ἔλδος* occurs for the first time in *Phaedo* will mislead. Not to speak of *Hippias major* 289 d, *Symp.* 210 b, *Gorgias* 504 cd, which are open to controversy, we have in *Phaedr.* 249 b *κατ' ἔλδος λεγόμενον*, and in *Meno* 72 c *ἐν γέ τι ἔλδος ταῦτὸν ἀπασαι ἔχοντι δὲ ὁ εἰσὶν ἀρεταί*. To say that *ἔλδος* is merely logical in these passages is to misconceive the whole doctrine. For both dialogues are full of transcendentalism and teach *ἀνάμνησις*.

The differences alleged between the *Politicus* and other dialogues are mostly imaginary. The method of dichotomy is not "abandoned as inadequate" (III, p. 181). It is merely illustrated further and improved --else why write another dialogue about it? The political theory and classification of governments, as I have shown in "Unity of Plato's Thought" (p. 62), does not differ from the *Republic* except in the form of presentation. The recognition of the opposition of the two temperaments is not "a notable piece of self-correction" (III, p. 184). It is merely a specially explicit statement of fundamental Platonic doctrine (cf. "Unity," pp. 11, 13). *Politicus* 267 c does not "revoke" the comparison of the ruler with the shepherd, *Rep.* 416 a, and 440 d (III, p. 357). The comparison is a literary commonplace from Homer down, the origination of which it is naïve to attribute to Antisthenes (III, p. 180). The *Republic* passages are purely literary and figurative. The *Politicus* merely points out that we can not reason as if the analogy were perfect. Neither is there any self-correction in the "revocation" of the comparison with the queen-bee, *Rep.* 520 b; *Polit.* 301 e. Plato always yearned for the scientific rule of the "capable man." In the *Republic* he indulges his fancy with the picture of a utopia which shall systematically produce him in the human hive. In the *Politicus* he ironically (*ώς δή φαμεν*) admits

that existent society provides no such man, and that we must therefore accept as second best the reign of law. Unless he was to rewrite the *Republic*, what else could he say?

Space fails to examine Professor Gomperz' interpretation of the *Timaeus*, with which he is hardly in sympathy, and which he therefore sometimes misunderstands. Necessity and the "cause of disordered motion" are not two principles, as he thinks, but one (III, pp. 210, 213). The plain meaning of the Idea of Good is missed by him as by most interpreters. And on all ultimate metaphysical problems he is apt to err, through a desire to defend modern positivism against the traditional Platonic absolutism, or through failure to perceive the real depth and essential rationalism of Plato's thought. Thus in the discussion of the theory of causation set forth in the *Phaedo* he misses the distinction between the teleological view which Socrates renounces as too difficult, and the purely logical and non-committal causation of the ideas, which is merely a consistent and intentional substitution of the *causa cognoscendi* for the *causa fiendi*.

In these specific and perhaps captious criticisms my object has not been to assert the infallibility of Plato. Much that is known to us he could not know. But within the sphere of his own experience his thought was elaborated and expressed with a consistency, a completeness, and a precision of which literature has few examples. To interpret him rightly is to exhibit this essential unity and sanity of his thought, not to hunt for flaws and self-contradictions which in at least nine cases out of ten prove to be misapprehensions of the interpreter.

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Untersuchungen zur Geschichte von Iran. Von J. MARQUART.

Zweites Heft [Schluss]. Leipzig: Dieterich, 1905. Pp. 258.
M. 10.20.

This is a continuation of the investigations published under the same title in Vols. LIV and LV of *Philologus*, and exhibits the same astounding mastery of the most diverse sources. Dealing exhaustively with numerous details of Iranian chronology and topography, the book contains much that is only of remote interest to the classicist. Yet the intimate connection of Persian with Greek history, and the fact that authors like Herodotus, Ctesias, Arrian, Curtius, etc., are among the sources under consideration (cf., e. g., the chapter on Alexander's march from Persepolis to Herat), justifies us in calling attention, if only thus briefly, to this important series of investigations.

CARL D. BUCK